

WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION AND THE FATE OF NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS

A REPORT ON THE WOMEN IN RESISTANCE (WIRE) DATA SET



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WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION AND THE FATE OF NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS:

A REPORT ON THE WOMEN IN RESISTANCE (WIRE) DATA SET

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Cover photo: Alaa Salah, a Sudanese woman leading powerful protest chants against President Omar al-Bashir, addresses protesters during a demonstration in front of the military headquarters in the capital Khartoum on April 10, 2019. Photo - AFP/Getty Images.

ABSTRACT

The Women in Resistance (WiRe) data set is the first of its kind to catalog women's participation in 338 maximalist resistance campaigns (i.e., those campaigns that call for the toppling of an oppressive government, or territorial self-determination). The data set identifies both nonviolent and violent maximalist campaigns in every country in the world from 1945 to 2014, providing a comprehensive and systematic look at various dimensions of women's participation in both types of campaigns. Frontline women's participation is quite common among the campaigns in the data set but more common in nonviolent campaigns. Crucially, the greater the role of women in the campaign (in terms of observed numerical participation), the larger the correlation with nonviolent methods, even in highly repressive contexts. Campaigns that feature greater women's participation—in terms of both the extent of women's frontline participation and the formal involvement of women's organizations—are more likely to maintain nonviolent discipline (i.e., are less likely to have violent flanks). Importantly, nonviolent campaigns with high degrees of frontline women's participation are also likelier to elicit loyalty shifts from security forces. The same is true for campaigns in which women participants actively call for peaceful mobilization. Ultimately, frontline women's participation is highly correlated with successful resistance campaigns, even when accounting for other factors such as campaign size. A similar effect holds for campaigns that feature gender-inclusive ideologies, which are more likely to succeed than campaigns without such ideologies. There are some signs that women's participation is associated with one common measure of gender equality—lower fertility rates—after a nonviolent campaign has succeeded. The same is not true for violent campaigns. However, this result must be treated with caution because of an abundance of missing data. Further research will better untangle the association between the level and scope of women's participation in nonviolent campaigns on longer-term indicators of gender equality. In the meantime, these descriptive findings are sufficient to suggest that any analysis that excludes a discussion of women's participation with regard to the strategy, dynamics, and outcomes of mass movements is likely incomplete.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

While women have always been part of organized resistance movements, recent cases including Sudan and Algeria have demonstrated how necessary this participation is and helped to address a historical tendency to elide the role of women in these movements. Despite this visibility, few studies have attempted to systematically document the distribution of women's participation in both nonviolent and armed resistance movements, or to evaluate the effect of women's participation on the character and success of these movements.

The Women in Resistance (WiRe) data set is the first of its kind to catalog women's participation in 338 maximalist resistance campaigns in every country in the world from 1945 to 2014 (i.e., those campaigns that call for the toppling of an oppressive government, or territorial self-determination). Because the data set identifies both nonviolent and violent maximalist campaigns, it provides a comprehensive and systematic look at various dimensions of women's participation in both types of resistance.

Key findings

1. Frontline women's participation is quite common among the campaigns in the data set but more common in nonviolent campaigns. Ninety-nine percent of nonviolent campaigns featured frontline women's participation compared with 76 percent of violent campaigns ($p < .001$). Only one nonviolent campaign, the anti-Chaudhry campaign in Fiji in 2000, did not feature any reported women's frontline participation.
2. The greater the role of women in the campaign (in terms of observed numerical participation), the larger the correlation with nonviolent methods, even in highly repressive contexts. Campaigns that feature greater women's participation—in terms of both the extent of women's frontline participation and the formal involvement of women's organizations—are more likely to

Kurdish YPG fighters. photo: Kurdishstruggle via Flickr



maintain nonviolent discipline (i.e., are less likely to have violent flanks). Importantly, nonviolent campaigns with high degrees of frontline women's participation are also likelier to elicit loyalty shifts from security forces. The same is true for campaigns in which women participants actively call for peaceful mobilization.

3. Frontline women's participation is highly correlated with successful resistance campaigns, even when accounting for other factors such as campaign size. A similar effect holds for campaigns that feature gender-inclusive ideologies, which are more likely to succeed than campaigns without such ideologies.
4. There are some signs that women's participation is associated with a common measure of gender equality—lower fertility rates—after a nonviolent

campaign has succeeded. The same is not true for violent campaigns. However, this result must be treated with caution because of missing data. Further research will better untangle the association between the level and scope of women's participation in nonviolent campaigns on longer-term and multidimensional indicators of gender equality.

5. Although additional research will allow for further insight into these correlations, the descriptive findings suggest that any analysis that excludes a discussion of women's power with regard to the strategy, dynamics, and outcomes of mass movements is likely incomplete—regardless of whether the campaign is armed or unarmed. It also calls for further feminist analysis within the study of nonviolent civil resistance more broadly.

II. INTRODUCTION: What Do We Know about Women's Participation in Rebellion and Resistance?

Recent uprisings in Sudan and Algeria demonstrate the power of women's mobilization to resist injustice and create change. Alaa Salah, the iconic "Nubian queen" of Khartoum, captivated the world by reciting poetry while dancing on top of a car as Omar Bashir's decades-long regime crumbled under popular pressure. And in Algeria, a grandmother of 13 has been cooking meals for 2,000 protesters per day during transitional negotiations, encouraging activists to continue sitting-in to demand a more hopeful future for her children and grandchildren. As Aili Tripp (2019) writes, women's participation was essential—both in making the uprising against Bouteflika a nonviolent one and in bringing forth the organizational know-how that ultimately resulted in his ouster.

If women were central to the downfall of Omar Bashir and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, such examples are the rule rather than the exception. Indeed, women's participation is ubiquitous in maximalist resistance campaigns, regardless of whether they are nonviolent or violent. The Women in Resistance (WiRe) data set is the first of its kind to catalog women's participation in 338 maximalist resistance campaigns (i.e., campaigns that call for the toppling of an oppressive government, or territorial self-determination). Because the data set identifies both nonviolent and violent maximalist campaigns in every country in the world from 1945 to 2014, it provides a comprehensive and systematic look at various dimensions of women's participation in mass mobilization more broadly. About 89 percent of campaigns in the data set had frontline women's participation, but this proportion was 99 percent for nonviolent campaigns and 76 percent for violent campaigns ($p < .001$).

This data set is presented at a time when research on women's participation in mass mobilization has increased dramatically. The Women, Peace and Security agenda has been particularly attentive to the role of women in war, as well as the role of gender in security. This research agenda has produced many celebrated studies on the role of female

Protests in Taksim Square, 2013. Photo: Mstyslav Chernov via Wikimedia Commons



combatants in armed groups cross-nationally (Alison 2009; Braithwaite and Ruiz 2018; Henshaw 2016; Loken 2018; Thomas and Bond 2015; Thomas and Wood 2017; Wood 2019), women's participation in armed groups in particular cases (Alpern 2011; Anagnostopoulou 2001; Cohen 2013; Eggert 2018; Gonzalez-Perez 2006; Israelsen 2018; Kampwirth 2002; King 2015; Klouzal 2008; Kosovo Gender Studies Centre 2008; Lobao 1990; Marks 2019a, 2019b; Mason 1992; Penn 2005; Shayne 1999; Tripp 2015; Viterna 2013), the role of war in women's empowerment (Berry 2018; Israelsen 2018; Molyneux 1985; Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017; Webster, Chen, and Beardsley 2019), the role of women peacekeepers in reducing various forms of violence (Karim and Beardsley 2017; Pruitt 2016), and the role of women's participation in peace negotiations in prolonging the peace (O'Reilly, Paffenholz, and Súilleabháin 2015; Paffenholz et al. 2016).

This project draws inspiration from recent studies attempting to catalogue the scope and degree of women's participation in armed groups across time and space. For instance, Thomas and Bond's (2015) groundbreaking study on women's participation in violent political organizations provided one of the first cross-national examinations of the push and pull factors that motivate and facilitate women's participation in different rebel groups across Africa. Other scholars, such as Cohen (2013), Henshaw (2016), Loken (2018), Thomas and Wood (2017), and Wood (2019), have likewise focused on the cross-national and cross-sectoral determinants of female participation in armed groups. Such work provides some opportunities to establish some baseline generalizations about the ways in which women's participation in armed groups operates globally, while also allowing scholars to assess the short- and long-term impacts on such participation.

This project calls for examining connections and divergence between the rich research program emerging around women's participation in insurgencies and the literature on civil resistance and social movements. Recent scholarship has indicated increasing interest in questions of how gender and femininity affect the onset and dynamics of nonviolent resistance (see, for example, Shaafteenaar 2017, who finds that increases in gender equality were associated with the onset of nonviolent campaigns; see also Baldez 2002). Yet a lack of cross-sectional data on women's participation in nonviolent campaigns analogous to that available for armed groups has hampered progress on more general questions related to the causes, dynamics, and outcomes of women's participation in nonviolent movements. Therefore, several popular claims or intuitions—such as the intuition that higher rates of women's participation should make nonviolent resistance campaigns more effective (Codur and King 2015; Principe 2017)—have gone untested in cross-national studies.

This project, therefore, attempts to introduce systematic data on different dimensions of women's participation and gender inclusivity in both nonviolent and violent campaigns. The goal is to provide an opportunity to test some existing theoretical hypotheses about the role of women's participation, women's leadership, and gender-inclusive ideologies on the outcomes of nonviolent mass resistance campaigns as well as armed ones. Moreover, these data provide an additional lens through which to view women's participation in conflict settings that may not have escalated into large-scale armed conflict. This data release and descriptive report is intended to introduce and briefly describe these data and illustrate their potential uses. Scholars or practitioners seeking to analyze the data further can do so by accessing the data at Harvard's Dataverse.

The Women in Resistance (WiRe) Data Set, v. 1

The WiRe data set attempts to contribute to a broader understanding of the descriptive trends in women's involvement in armed and unarmed mass movements worldwide between 1945 and 2014. The WiRe data set expands upon the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data set with additional variables that identify the scope, type, and degree of women's participation in maximalist campaigns. Maximalist campaigns are those that call for the removal of an incumbent national leader or the independence of a country through self-determination, secession, or the expulsion of a colonial power or military occupation. Broadly speaking, these campaigns, therefore, have anti-government goals, or territorial goals; campaigns that aim for reforms short of these maximalist goals are not included in NAVCO. Moreover, the NAVCO data include only contentious episodes where there were at least 1,000 observed participants coordinating their tactics to achieve these goals over time.

NAVCO classifies those mobilizations according to whether they relied on primarily nonviolent or violent methods. For more on the inclusion criteria and coding rules for the NAVCO data set, please see <http://www.navcodata.org>.

For the purposes of this descriptive report, several key covariates in NAVCO are worth describing. Most notably, each maximalist campaign is coded as a success or failure using strict criteria. Successes are those campaigns that remove the incumbent national leader by irregular means or achieve territorial independence within a year of the peak of the campaign's mobilization. They had to have had a discernable impact on those outcomes to qualify as successes. If they did not meet these three criteria, campaigns are coded as failures. This includes campaigns that were ongoing as of the end of 2014.

Second, among the primarily nonviolent campaigns, 52 (30 percent) of them had violent flanks (Figure 1). This means that at some point during the overwhelmingly nonviolent campaign, some individuals used violence—including street fighting; attacking counter-protesters, police, or bystanders; or some other limited armed action—despite the fact that the campaign continued to use mass nonviolent action as its strategy. Such violent flanks are common in mass mobilizations, where diffused leadership has little ability to control the behavior of all of the participants at each event. Yet, it is notable that the routinized use of violence is still the exception rather than the rule among the nonviolent campaigns under study here.

These variables are useful, however, because they allow us to examine three important aspects of mass mobilization: (1) the primary method of struggle; (2) the ability of the campaigns to avoid violent flanks and maintain nonviolent discipline; and (3) the success or failure of the struggle.

FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF NONVIOLENT AND VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS IN NAVCO 1.2



The campaign is the unit of analysis in the WiRe data. The WiRe data set draws inspiration from several other projects that identify cross-national data on women and gender within violent and nonviolent organizations.

Women's Participation in Nonviolent and Violent Maximalist Campaigns, 1945–2014

Following Thomas and Bond (2015) and Henshaw (2016), I developed several variables identifying whether women were observed participating in mass mobilization in frontline, support, leadership, or symbolic roles (see the codebook for the distinctions between these roles). These are dichotomous variables identifying the presence or absence of women observed in those roles in available source material.

I also included variables identifying the *extent* of women's participation as frontline participants within their movements. Possible values include the following:

- 0 – **Not observed.** Indicates no observed frontline role for women.
- 1 – **Limited participation.** Indicates a handful of observed frontline women participants (i.e., women are less than 25 percent of frontline participants).
- 2 – **Moderate participation.** Women are clearly and routinely involved in the front line of the campaign, and the proportion of women campaigners is significant (between 25 percent and 50 percent of frontline participants).
- 3 – **Extensive participation.** Women frontline campaigners comprised the majority (at least 50 percent) of observed participants.

I used a similar range for the variable reporting the extent of women leaders of movements:

- 0 – **Not observed.** Indicates no observed formal women leaders in campaign's upper echelons/decision-making bodies.
- 1 – **Women are among formal leadership.** One or more women are among the campaign's leaders, but the primary leader or figurehead is not a woman.
- 2 – **Women primary campaign leaders.** Indicates that the primary campaign leader is one or more women.

Figures 2–7 depict the distribution of these data.

Frontline women's participation is ubiquitous in resistance campaigns, regardless of whether they are nonviolent or violent. About 89 percent of all campaigns in the data set had frontline women's participation. However, this proportion was 99 percent for nonviolent campaigns and 76 percent for violent campaigns ($p < .001$; see Figure 2). Only one campaign during the postwar era, the anti-Chaudhry campaign in Fiji in 2000, did not feature any observed women's frontline participation.

FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF MAXIMALIST CAMPAIGNS WITH DIFFERENT DEGREES OF FRONTLINE WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION, 1945–2014






FIGURE 3: PERCENTAGE OF MAXIMALIST CAMPAIGNS WITH DIFFERENT DEGREES OF WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP, 1945-2014




In most regions of the world, women are observed as frontline participants in a higher number of nonviolent campaigns than violent campaigns (Figure 4). The two exceptions are sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, where violent campaigns featuring visible frontline women's participation slightly outnumbered nonviolent ones. These regional differences, however, are not statistically significant.

FIGURE 4: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MAXIMALIST CAMPAIGNS WITH FRONTLINE WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION, 1945-2014



That said, campaigns where women are involved in leadership roles tend to be nonviolent ones, in every region except for sub-Saharan Africa, where there are slightly more armed rebellions with women leaders than nonviolent campaigns. Again, this difference is not statistically significant and is due to the fact that there were slightly more violent campaigns than nonviolent campaigns during this period.

FIGURE 5: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MAXIMALIST CAMPAIGNS WITH WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP ROLES, 1945–2014



One of the most interesting and important trends in the data concerns the increase in women’s participation and leadership in mass mobilization over time. As Figures 6 and 7 show, onsets of maximalist campaigns featuring women’s frontline participation and women’s leadership have increased dramatically during the postwar period.

FIGURE 6: ONSETS OF MAXIMALIST CAMPAIGNS WITH FRONTLINE WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION, 1945–2014






FIGURE 7: ONSETS OF MAXIMALIST CAMPAIGNS WITH WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP ROLES, 1945–2014



Similarly, Figure 8 summarizes trends in women’s participation in nonviolent and violent campaigns over time. It identifies the proportion of campaigns in each category in which at least 25 percent of the participants are women, or in which women are formally involved in the campaign’s leadership. As we can see, since 1970, the vast majority of nonviolent campaigns have featured moderate–extensive women’s participation. For violent campaigns, the proportion of campaigns featuring moderate–extensive women’s participation or leadership declined from 1970 to 2010. From 2010 to 2014, armed campaigns saw a resurgence in the proportion of those featuring women’s participation or leadership (about 60 percent of campaigns), but women participated at the same levels in about 90 percent of nonviolent campaigns during the same period.



Protest speech at Occupation of Trafalgar Square. Photo: Garry Knight via Flickr

FIGURE 8: PROPORTION OF MAXIMALIST CAMPAIGNS WITH MODERATE TO EXTENSIVE LEVELS OF FRONTLINE WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION OR WITH WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP, 1945-2014

For the purposes of this report, there are several additional variables I employ to better understand some different dimensions of gender relationships within the campaigns. First, following Asal et al. (2013), I developed an ordinal indicator of whether the campaign has a gender-inclusive ideology:

Gender-inclusive ideology?

0 – **Not observed.** No segments of the campaign were observed explicitly mentioning that the ideology is gender-inclusive (i.e., that women should be included in public life).

1 – **Observed.** Segments of the campaign were explicitly calling for the inclusion of women in public life.

2 – **Contested.** Segments of the campaign were observed actively debating the inclusion or exclusion of women in public life.

Next, I developed several variables that attempt to proxy for capacity for sustained organizing and engagement (Codur and King 2015; McAllister 1999; Tripp 2019), as well as whether women's groups express a preference for peaceful mobilization explicitly (Costain 2000).

Formal women's groups involved in campaign?

0 – **Not observed.** Formal women's organizations were not observed participating in the campaign.

1 – **Yes.** Formal women's groups, organizations, or associations are directly participating in the campaign.

Formal women's groups observed explicitly calling for peace?

0 – **Not observed.** Women participants or groups were not observed explicitly calling for peaceful mobilization.

1 – **Yes.** Women participants or formal women's groups are explicitly calling for peaceful mobilization or peace. This includes, by inference, women calling for methods of peaceful protest (e.g., sex strikes, candlelight vigils, etc.).

I summarize additional variables in the appendix.

Limitations of the WiRe Data Set

There are several important limitations to the WiRe data set that readers and users should keep in mind. All of these limitations speak to the trade-offs involved in large-scale data collection as well as the opportunities for further refinement and extension as new data collection methods become available.

Dichotomous coding of gender identities. In identifying women participants, the data look for the presence of people with ascribed female or femme identities. This, of course, is not intended to erase the presence of nonconforming or queer identities, but the data collection at this stage does focus on a dichotomous treatment of gender. Contemporary scholarship admonishes against replicating the gender binary, particularly in the production of count data, which can be viewed as reinforcing damaging gender stereotype hierarchies (Sjoberg, Kadera, and Thies 2018; Nagel 2019). Moreover, the data focus only on the presence or absence of women, without accounting for important overlapping identities (such as class, ability, age, ethnicity, race, citizenship status, and sexuality) that may be crucial for understanding structural differences in the risks, costs, and effects of participation among women. Future iterations of data collection could seek to add additional nuance for a more sophisticated analysis.

Highly aggregated unit of analysis. Because the unit of analysis is the campaign, there is no opportunity to evaluate ebbs, flows, or geographical variation in women's participation within campaigns. Because the focus is on peak participation, and coding assigns a single value for each variable, it is difficult to establish whether women's participation occurred equally throughout the life of a campaign. For example, during the Colombian civil war, women served in supportive roles during their initial recruitment into the FARC; only later did they begin to engage in armed combat (Darden, Henshaw, and Szekely 2019, 80). There are opportunities to disaggregate these data into longitudinal form, although missingness becomes very problematic when coders attempt to look at year-to-year changes in participation and leadership from publicly available sources.

Possibility of underreporting. Particularly in historical cases, information about many different features of campaigns were underreported. This includes reliable estimates of total participation, techniques of resistance, and participation or acquiescence of diverse groups within societies. There is reason to believe that before women's mobilization began to receive sustained scholarly attention in the 1970s, feminist scholarship had not yet begun to recover and uncover women's histories. This is why the WiRe data currently cover only the post-WWII era, during which historical records were more easily accessible to research assistants. That said, the postwar setting also means that important cases of women's mobilization that preceded World War II are not included in this analysis. Such instances include cases as diverse as India's Independence movement, the Chinese Revolution, the Arab Revolt in British Mandate Palestine, the Jewish National movement, Egypt's and Iran's constitutional revolutions, the anti-Nazi partisan groups during WWII, and numerous anti-colonial uprisings in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the time coverage limitation means that the findings reported here are limited to the postwar international context, during which there has been a growing trend toward women's empowerment (Webster, Chen, and Beardsley 2019; see also Tripp 2015).

There is scope for expanding the data to the 1900–1945 period—and updating the coverage to include more recent cases that have set on between 2014 and 2019—with the next iteration of data collection. This work is currently underway (see Marks and Chenoweth 2019).

A Methodological Note

There are good reasons to be skeptical of attempts to quantify women's participation in conflicts (Sjoberg, Kadera, and Thies 2018; Nagel 2019). Numerous studies have challenged the tendency to essentialize women as peaceful, suggesting that women can be just as likely to support direct forms of aggression and, in some cases, are even more likely than men to support indirect forms of aggression (see, for instance, Ben Shitrit, Elad-Strenger, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2017; Cohen



Yezidi resistance fighters. Photo: Kurdishstruggle via Flickr

2013). Other critics rightly resist the dichotomization of men and women, suggesting that the field has been overly motivated by questions of sex rather than gender (Sjoberg, Kadera, and Thies 2018). These concerns are well-founded, and the provision of these data is not an effort to minimize or sidestep these concerns.

Many of the descriptive findings used here are supportive of feminist arguments about the importance of gender inclusivity in movements for change—especially those that emphasize the power of women’s participation in eliciting major national-level political transformations. This is a particularly important enterprise if these findings can provide some further practical guidance in advancing gender equity during and after conflict. In this regard, this report and the development of these data do not presume a superiority of quantitative or positivist research as an epistemological approach, but rather, embrace the admonition by Sjoberg, Kadera, and Thies (2018) to foster methodological pluralism in the study of women, gender, conflict, and peace. The WiRe data set and preliminary analysis in this report offer a new resource for feminist scholarship. To fully explore the complicated dynamics of women’s involvement in people power, using numerical data alone is not enough (Paffenholz et al. 2016; Nagel 2019). However, the patterns in these data have a story to tell and signal important trends and new questions in the history of the human struggle for collective liberation.

III. EFFECTS OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION ON THE OUTCOMES OF MAXIMALIST RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS

This report provides descriptive data regarding three prominent narratives regarding women and civil resistance: (1) that women are more likely to participate in nonviolent resistance campaigns than violent campaigns (Codur and King 2015; Costain 2000; Principe 2017); (2) that campaigns of nonviolent resistance featuring a large number of women participants are more likely to maintain nonviolent discipline, and more likely to elicit loyalty shifts within the opponent elite (Codur and King 2015; Principe 2017); and (3) that women's participation in mass mobilization can lead to genuine women's empowerment in the longer term (McAllister 1999; Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006).

A Note on Correlation vs. Causation

This section features a series of correlational analyses on core variables in the WiRe data set covering maximalist resistance campaigns from 1945 to 2014. The findings should be interpreted as preliminary and descriptive for two reasons.

First, the statistical associations identified here establish correlation but not causation. This means that the findings describe important relationships between variables that may be related to causal processes between the variables—including reverse causation—or because the variables are endogenous to some unobserved factors that are affecting both the independent and dependent variables. For instance, it may be the rising global trend of women's empowerment during the postwar era is explaining *both* the rise of women's participation within resistance campaigns and the success of the campaigns. As such, any observed statistical association between women's participation and their outcomes may be endogenous to women's empowerment more generally (see Tripp 2015 on the increasing norm of women's empowerment over time). At this stage, this important possibility cannot be ruled out, although endogeneity ought to be treated as an alternative hypothesis rather than as a definitive rejection of these statistical associations. It is important to note that a rich qualitative literature on women's mobilization and participation in armed and unarmed groups suggests that there are many reasons why an increase in women's participation may lead to greater chances of success, including the addition of a large quantity of potential supporters to the movement; the ability of women to draw on gender roles to reduce overt repression against the movement; and the creative, tactical innovations women often develop as people typically tasked with managing households and family well-being (Codur and King 2015; Principe 2017).


Second, because of missing data on gender equity in other data sets, a more sophisticated multivariate analysis using data imported from other contextual variables was not possible for the purposes of this report. However, next steps will merge the WiRe data set with the newly released VDem data set, which has broader temporal and cross-national coverage, as well as numerous indicators of women's empowerment over time. This work in progress has the potential to yield productive insights regarding the impacts of women's participation on gender equality in the longer term, while also taking into account other factors that might influence both the reliance on nonviolent or violent resistance and the changes in gender hierarchies that result from women's mobilization in maximalist campaigns (see Marks and Chenoweth 2019). Such efforts will complement recent research on the role of armed conflict on women's empowerment (e.g., Webster, Chen, and Beardsley 2019) by examining the role of nonviolent resistance in women's empowerment under similar circumstances.

Thus, readers should approach the following results bearing in mind the typical caveat that correlation is not necessarily the same as causation. That said, correlation is also suggestive of an association that merits further inquiry.

Effects of Women's Participation on Campaign Success

Many scholars have postulated that women's participation is one of the factors that makes nonviolent resistance so successful (for an excellent overview, see Codur and King 2015). In a model^a controlling for a variety of other factors, frontline women's participation is highly correlated with successful resistance campaigns. The greater the extent of women's frontline participation, the greater the probability of success.

FIGURE 9: EFFECT OF WOMEN'S FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION ON THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF CAMPAIGN SUCCESS AS A FUNCTION OF PEAK PARTICIPATION, 1945–2014




NOTES: Marginal effects calculated following a logistic regression controlling for women's issues as central to the campaign, gender-inclusive ideology, women's organizations calling for peaceful mobilization, and regime violence against the campaign. $n = 293$; $p < .001$. Robust standard errors are clustered around country. 95% confidence intervals are removed for ease of visualization. The x-axis is adjusted slightly for scale, with the minimum value of 1000 observed participants rather than 0.

Indeed, the data in the WiRe data set suggest that the extent of women's frontline participation is strongly correlated with nonviolent campaigns as opposed to violent ones ($p < .001$). When the model in Figure 9 is constrained only to nonviolent campaigns, the effect of frontline women's participation only holds in cases where participation is moderate or extensive (see Figure 10).^b That said, it is notable that when men significantly outnumber women on the front lines of nonviolent campaigns, increased participation is not associated with an increased probability of success.

^a For the purposes of presentation, I do not present tabular results here. Replication data, source files, do-files, and log files are available at the Harvard Dataverse site.

^b Given that women were excluded from frontline participation in only one case of nonviolent resistance, I did not generate predicted margins for instances in which no frontline women were observed.

FIGURE 10: EFFECT OF WOMEN'S FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION ON THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGN SUCCESS AS A FUNCTION OF PEAK PARTICIPATION, 1945–2014



NOTES: Marginal effects calculated following a logistic regression controlling for women’s issues as central to the campaign, gender-inclusive ideology, women’s organizations calling for peaceful mobilization, and regime violence against the campaign. $n = 148$; $p < .001$. Robust standard errors are clustered around country. 95% confidence intervals are removed for ease of visualization. The x-axis is adjusted slightly for scale, with the minimum value of 1000 observed participants rather than 0.

Women’s participation in nonviolent resistance is much more likely to be voluntary ($p < .001$). Reports of coerced women’s participation occurred in less than 2 percent of the nonviolent campaigns, compared with 39 percent of armed campaigns. Unsurprisingly, coerced women’s participation is highly correlated with women serving in support roles in armed and unarmed movements ($p < .002$). But the participation of women in support roles—which is observed in 88 percent of violent campaigns and 86 percent of nonviolent campaigns—is not statistically associated with success.

Moreover, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the extent of formal leadership of women in nonviolent campaigns—which is highly correlated with the extent of women’s frontline participation ($p < .001$)—has no statistically significant association with success.


It is really the frontline women’s participation that seems to be the most powerful correlate regarding success.

Effects of Gender-Inclusive Ideology on Campaign Success

Asal et al. (2013) found that among ethnopolitical organizations in the Middle East and North Africa, having a gender-inclusive ideology was strongly correlated with a group’s use of nonviolent (rather than violent) methods. Thomas and Bond (2015), on the other hand, found that gender-inclusive ideologies made armed groups more likely to attract women participants.

Here, I find that campaigns with gender-inclusive ideologies tend to have higher rates of success. One possible explanation for this is that gender-inclusive groups create lower barriers to entry for women participants, encouraging them to join such groups (Thomas and Bond 2015).^c

FIGURE 11: EFFECT OF GENDER-INCLUSIVE IDEOLOGY ON THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGN SUCCESS AS A FUNCTION OF PEAK PARTICIPATION, 1945–2014




NOTES: Marginal effects calculated following a logistic regression controlling for women's issues as central to the campaign, women leaders observed in the campaign, women's organizations calling for peaceful mobilization, and regime violence against the campaign. $n = 148$; $p < .001$. Robust standard errors are clustered around country. 95% confidence intervals are removed for ease of visualization. The x-axis is adjusted slightly for scale, with the minimum value of 1000 observed participants rather than 0.

Formal women's organizations were involved in about 57 percent of violent campaigns, whereas they were involved in about 66 percent of the nonviolent campaigns ($p < .001$). Like high levels of frontline women's participation and a gender-inclusive ideology, the presence of formal women's groups was associated with a strong increase in the predicted probability of success (Figure 12).

^c However, this association appears not to be an artifact of significant correlation between gender-inclusive ideology and the extent of women's participation ($\text{corr} = .39$).

FIGURE 12: EFFECT OF FORMAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS' PARTICIPATION ON THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGN SUCCESS AS A FUNCTION OF PEAK PARTICIPATION, 1945–2014



NOTES: Marginal effects calculated following a logistic regression controlling for women's issues as central to the campaign, women leaders observed in the campaign, women's organizations calling for peaceful mobilization, and regime violence against the campaign. $n = 148$; $p < .001$. Robust standard errors are clustered around country. 95% confidence intervals are removed for ease of visualization. The x-axis is adjusted slightly for scale, with the minimum value of 1000 observed participants rather than 0.

This may be related to the capacity of women's organizations to provide venues for deliberation, planning, training and preparation, and conflict resolution within the movement (Banaszak 1996; Codur and King 2015)—as well as to call on the significant resources of women members to mobilize at key points of the struggle.

Nonviolent Campaign Dynamics: Nonviolent Discipline and Security Force Defections

For many nonviolent campaigns, a high level of popular participation can be a double-edged sword. While large numbers of people can be crucial to campaign success, mass participation can also introduce major challenges in preparation, training, and coordination regarding nonviolent discipline (Pinckney 2016). When nonviolent discipline breaks down, violent flanks tend to lead to more indiscriminate repression, the loss of sympathy among potential supporters, and a more homogeneous and risk-acceptant participation base (Chenoweth and Schock 2015).

Some organizers have attempted to deal with this dilemma by disseminating documents calling all participants to remain peaceful in their interactions with security forces, counterprotesters, and one another. For example, during the US Civil Rights movement, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) published a pamphlet containing its Rules for Action, which set out 13 guidelines for how CORE expected participants to maintain and stay accountable to nonviolent principles. During


the January 25 Revolution in Egypt, activists circulated paper handouts with instructions for how to protest “intelligently,” with verbal and animated recommendations about how to maintain nonviolent discipline. More recently, one activist issued a viral statement regarding the “18 commandments” of nonviolent civil resistance during Algeria’s Smile Revolution.

Of course, in order for such rules to have the desired effect, participants must be receptive to them. Some have argued that high rates of women’s participation in mass campaigns should reduce breakdowns in nonviolent discipline because women are both more receptive to discourses about the moral and strategic value of nonviolence (Costain 2000) and more willing to promote and reinforce such discourses (Codur and King 2015; Costain 2000; Principe 2017).

Among nonviolent campaigns, 63 percent of campaigns featured women’s organizations that formally called for peace, compared to 35 percent of violent campaigns ($p < .001$). And consistent with the expectations above, it appears that at high levels of participation, such appeals may reduce the predicted probability of a breakdown in nonviolent discipline.

Indeed, in Figure 13, we can see that as participation increases, calls for peace have a strong substantive correlation with whether violent flanks set on. When women’s organizations are actively calling for peace, such breakdowns tend to be less common. When women’s organizations are not actively calling for peace, such breakdowns in discipline become increasingly likely as the campaign’s participation size increases.


FIGURE 13: EFFECT OF FORMAL WOMEN’S ORGANIZATIONS’ CALLS FOR PEACE ON THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A BREAKDOWN IN NONVIOLENT DISCIPLINE AS A FUNCTION OF PEAK PARTICIPATION, 1945–2014



NOTES: Marginal effects calculated following a logistic regression controlling for women’s issues as central to the campaign, security force defections, gender-inclusive ideology, and regime violence against the campaign. $n = 148$; $p < .001$. Robust standard errors are clustered around country. 95% confidence intervals are removed for ease of visualization. The x-axis is adjusted slightly for scale, with the minimum value of 1000 observed participants rather than 0.

Similarly, nonviolent campaigns that feature extensive frontline participation of women are less likely to feature breakdowns in nonviolent discipline as they grow in size (Figure 14). This negative association is only visible when women make up the majority of frontline participants, and the effect is substantively quite modest (a 5 percent reduction in the predicted probability of a violent flank setting on as movement size moves from 1,000 to 1.5 million participants). However, at the highest levels of participation, extensive frontline involvement of women reduces the predicted probability of violent flanks by over 20 percent relative to movements where men significantly outnumber women on the front line.

FIGURE 14: EFFECT OF WOMEN'S FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION ON THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A BREAKDOWN IN NONVIOLENT DISCIPLINE AS A FUNCTION OF PEAK PARTICIPATION, 1945–2014




NOTES: Marginal effects calculated following a logistic regression controlling for women’s issues as central to the campaign, security force defections, gender-inclusive ideology, and regime violence against the campaign. n = 148; p < .001. Robust standard errors are clustered around country. 95% confidence intervals are removed for ease of visualization. The x-axis is adjusted slightly for scale, with the minimum value of 1000 observed participants rather than 0.

Does women’s participation affect the likelihood that security forces will withdraw their cooperation with the regime? This is an important question because a common explanation for the success of civil resistance campaigns is the tendency for different pillars of state support—particularly the security forces—to stop cooperating with the regime when faced with large-scale, nonviolent mass mobilization (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Such noncooperation can take the form of throwing down weapons and joining protesters, calling in sick to work, pretending not to hear an order to repress, or even protecting protesters against others who are threatening violence against them.

As Figure 15 shows, greater levels of frontline women's participation are indeed associated with an increase in the predicted probability of security force defections among nonviolent campaigns. The data suggest that above a certain threshold of participation (about 450,000), high levels of visible women's involvement may encourage security forces to shift their loyalties away from the regime or disobey orders to repress a campaign with lethal measures.


FIGURE 15: EFFECT OF WOMEN'S FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION ON THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF SECURITY FORCE DEFECTIONS AS A FUNCTION OF PEAK PARTICIPATION IN NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS, 1945–2014



NOTES: Marginal effects calculated following a logistic regression controlling for women's issues as central to the campaign, presence of a violent flank, gender-inclusive ideology, and regime violence against the campaign. $n = 148$; $p < .001$. Robust standard errors are clustered around country. 95% confidence intervals are removed for ease of visualization. The x-axis is adjusted slightly for scale, with the minimum value of 1000 observed participants rather than 0.

Similarly, calls for peace among women's organizations at such times may also reassure security forces, often overwhelmingly comprised of men, that they can essentially withdraw their support from the regime without risking their lives (Figure 16).

FIGURE 16: EFFECT OF FORMAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS' CALLS FOR PEACE ON THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF SECURITY FORCE DEFECTIONS AS A FUNCTION OF PEAK PARTICIPATION IN NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS, 1945–2014



NOTES: Marginal effects calculated following a logistic regression controlling for women's issues as central to the campaign, presence of a violent flank, gender-inclusive ideology, and regime violence against the campaign. $n = 148$; $p < .001$. Robust standard errors are clustered around country. 95% confidence intervals are removed for ease of visualization. The x-axis is adjusted slightly for scale, with the minimum value of 1000 observed participants rather than 0.

Indeed, it appears that women's mobilization—in terms of quantity, organizational capacity, and expression of goals related to the peaceful resolution of maximalist nonviolent campaigns—is associated with the maintenance of nonviolent discipline among fellow dissidents and the increased likelihood of security forces' withdrawing their cooperation from the incumbent regime.

Long-Term Impacts of Women's Participation


To what degree does women's participation in mass mobilization affect gender hierarchies in the aftermath of the conflict? Recent studies raise doubts about the degree to which gains in women's empowerment in the context of large-scale conflict extend beyond it (Bernal 2000; Berry 2018; Molyneux 1985; Webster, Chen, and Beardsley 2019). Feminist scholars point out that after many campaigns in which women have played a crucial role in organizing and leading them, women and women's concerns are sidelined or even punished for their participation in the aftermath (Faludi 1991; Middleton-Dezner et al. 2015; Sholkamy 2013).

On the other hand, some scholars have found that, in particular cases, women's participation in social movements has affected gender roles beyond the conflict as well. Many have argued that women's involvement in mass mobilization has had an undeniable, substantive impact on progress in gender equity and women's political representation worldwide (McAllister 1999; Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006). As Cable (1992, 35) notes regarding her observation of a local environmental campaign, "the practical necessity that drives women to change their gender role behavior in the social movement organization subsequently prompts changes in their domestic lives."

Here I briefly take up the question of whether women's participation in nonviolent and violent campaigns affects the long-term gender hierarchies within the societies affected by focusing on one indicator of gender equality. Fertility rates are a commonly used indicator of gender equality. High fertility rates correspond with gender inequality, whereas low fertility rates are generally understood as an indicator of relative gender equality. A research assistant collected data on fertility rates from the World Bank's Global Development Indicators and transformed the indicator to identify the reported fertility rate in each country relative to the global mean. Therefore, values above 1 indicate fertility rates greater than the global mean, and values below 1 indicate fertility rates lower than the global mean.

Fertility rates after conflict provide an opportunity to gauge the impact of women's participation during conflict on this dimension of women's equity in the aftermath (Caprioli 2005; Urdal and Primus 2015). I developed a simple OLS regression model where the dependent variable is the fertility rate five years after the campaign end-year. The primary explanatory covariate is the extent of women's frontline participation in the campaigns. Of course, all else being equal, the best predictor of fertility rates in the current year is the fertility rate in the previous year. Therefore, I use an indicator of fertility rates relative to the global mean during the first year of the campaign as a control variable. I also control for whether the campaign elevated women's issues, whether the campaign was nonviolent, whether the campaign had a gender-inclusive ideology, the duration of the campaign, and whether the regime used violence against the campaign.

FIGURE 17: EFFECT OF WOMEN'S FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION ON POST-CONFLICT FERTILITY RATES RELATIVE TO THE GLOBAL MEAN, 1945–2014



NOTES: Marginal effects calculated following an OLS regression controlling for women's issues as central to the campaign, whether the primary method of resistance is nonviolent, gender-inclusive ideology, regime violence against the campaign, and campaign duration. $n = 184$; $p < .001$. Robust standard errors are clustered around country. 95% confidence intervals are removed for ease of visualization. The x-axis is adjusted slightly for scale, with the minimum value of 1000 observed participants rather than 0.

Figure 17 shows that although fertility rates are remarkably static five years after a campaign ends, they actually tend to increase in situations where women have been excluded or minimized as frontline participants in mass mobilization. Moderate frontline participation is associated with status quo fertility rates, whereas only extensive frontline participation is associated with a modest decline.

Using this test as a first step indicates support for the idea that although women's participation is essential for the success of nonviolent resistance campaigns, gender equity does not necessarily follow from such victories (Middleton-Detzner et al. 2015; Sholkamy 2013; Webster, Chen, and Beardsley 2019). Such reductions may be less related to actual changes in gender equity and more related to the fact that war dislocates, separates, or destroys families, providing fewer opportunities for pregnancy (Urdal and Primus 2015). War also diminishes access to health care, particularly for women, meaning that infant mortality rates may also increase as the fertility rate declines (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003; Urdal and Primus 2015).

Of course, the ability of women frontline participants to affect patriarchal structures in a durable way after the conflict has ended may depend upon whether the campaign in which they participated succeeded. Figure 18 identifies the correlation between the extent of women's frontline participation against post-conflict fertility rates only for victorious campaigns. It also breaks down the results according to the primary resistance method of the campaign.

Strikingly, among nonviolent campaigns, we see that the extent of women's participation has a statistically and substantively significant negative impact on the post-conflict fertility rate. Among violent campaigns, the extent of women's participation has a much more modest effect on post-conflict fertility rates. In fact, it appears that in the aftermath of violent conflict,

Women's March in Calgary. Photo: jMacPherson via Flickr




fertility rates are actually highest when women have participated in extensive frontline combat. This is a puzzling finding, although it also may speak to the expectation that women who have engaged in armed combat may be forced back into ascribed gender roles in the aftermath of conflict (MacKenzie 2012). More generally, rebel victories often come at the cost of infrastructural damage to society, including to health-care systems, which could mean a decline in services for women's health and access to reproductive planning resources (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003).

Another striking insight from Figure 18 is that the association between the extent of women's frontline participation in nonviolent and violent campaigns is quite dependent upon the country's pre-conflict fertility rates. For instance, among the armed campaigns, we can see that in countries with lower-than-average fertility rates at the outset of conflict, women's participation in armed groups reduced post-conflict fertility rates fairly dramatically. These reductions are largely erased or reversed among countries with the highest fertility rates at the outset.^d

This pattern is the inverse for nonviolent campaigns. On the left-hand panel in Figure 18, we can see that the extent of women's frontline participation was only correlated with substantial reductions in fertility rates in countries with higher-than-average fertility rates at the outset. As such, it is women activists in countries where fertility rates are highest at the beginning of a nonviolent campaign that gained the most from their participation in terms of post-conflict fertility rates.

FIGURE 18: EFFECT OF WOMEN'S FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION ON POST-CONFLICT FERTILITY RATES (RELATIVE TO THE GLOBAL MEAN) AMONG SUCCESSFUL NONVIOLENT AND VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS, 1945–2014



^d Caprioli (2005) argues that countries with high fertility rates are those in which armed conflict is more likely to set on in the first place.

NOTES: Marginal effects calculated following an OLS regression controlling for women's issues as central to the campaign, whether the primary method of resistance is nonviolent, gender-inclusive ideology, regime violence against the campaign, and campaign duration. For nonviolent campaigns, $n = 59$; for violent campaigns, $n = 24$; $p < .001$. Robust standard errors are clustered around country. 95% confidence intervals are removed for ease of visualization. The x-axis is adjusted slightly for scale, with the minimum value of 1000 observed participants rather than 0.

Relative fertility rates are not the only indicator of gender equality, nor is it necessarily the best, especially where violent and nonviolent campaigns have differential effects on the health infrastructure. Furthermore, these particular results may be somewhat unstable because of the small sample size in each model. As mentioned above, VDem's women's empowerment index provides an important resource through which to probe these impacts further. Efforts to do so are underway (Marks and Chenoweth 2019).

Summary and Implications

These preliminary findings provide some tentative, descriptive support that extensive frontline participation among women may be vital for the success of resistance campaigns. Moreover, such participation also appears to be influential in yielding meaningful changes on at least one indicator of gender equity after the campaign is over.

Although additional research will allow for further insight into these correlations, even these tentative, descriptive findings are sufficient to assert that any analysis that excludes a discussion of women's participation with regard to the strategy, dynamics, and outcomes of mass movements is likely incomplete—regardless of whether the campaign is armed or unarmed. Of course, an argument suggesting that women are instrumental to the success of nonviolent resistance does not imply that instrumentalizing women's participation will necessarily yield movement success. Indeed, if anything, these findings call for a more thorough integration of feminist analysis and practice into the field of strategic nonviolent civil resistance more broadly (see McGuinness 1993; Codur and King 2015; King 2015; Principe 2017).

IV. METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

The Data Collection Process

Two research assistants independently collected and coded data for each campaign. The coders had access to the project codebook but did not have access to one another's source materials or coding decisions. Research assistants collected data from a diverse array of source materials, which were identified largely through internet and university library catalog searches relevant to each campaign. Research assistants conducted focused searches to find scholarly, journalistic, archival, or visual source material on the role of women and gender in each campaign. Such materials included scholarly books and articles, news articles, websites, existing sources of data (such as Thomas and Bond 2015), reports or archives of the participants in the groups, memoirs, NGO and government reports, online photographs, videos, or films of campaign participants engaging in resistance activities. Most materials were English-language, although some source materials were in Spanish, Portuguese, or French. With the exception of the scholarly books and articles, nearly all of the content from which the research assistants coded the data were open source.

Generally speaking, research assistants were able to find sufficient material from which to code the data through this method. Once they found particular sources that allowed them to code a variable, they would enter the data into a spreadsheet along with a link to the source, as well as any notes about rationale for the data entry. Often they found multiple independent sources to triangulate data and justify their coding decisions; in such cases, they listed all relevant sources.



Protests in Bahrain. Photo: Al Jazeera English via Flickr

At times, research assistants found conflicting information, such as an article that stated that women comprised one-third of the membership of a rebel group and another article stating that women comprised one-tenth of the membership. When they found such conflicting sources, they would seek further independent sources to adjudicate which estimate was the most reliable. For instance, sources that were published in peer-reviewed outlets were generally considered more reliable than sources with ambiguous citation practices.

Once the research assistants completed their coding, I combined their data for comparison. Where research assistants agreed on a particular coding decision, I verified the information by cross-checking it with the source material provided and marked their joint coding decision as “true.” When there was disagreement between the research assistants on a particular coding decision, I returned to the source material from which they coded the observation. In all cases of disagreement, conflicting coding decisions resulted from research assistants’ relying on different source material that made competing claims. In such cases, I conducted additional searches to attempt to find independent sources that could confirm which coding decision was the most reliable.

Inter-coder Reliability

Inter-coder reliability was quite high: research assistants agreed on 94.57 percent of coding decisions, which I attribute to fairly straightforward, binary coding rules among most of the variables.

There was some variation in inter-reliability among these variables. Perhaps unsurprisingly, ordinal variables had slightly lower levels of agreement. For example, the lowest inter-coder agreement occurred for the ordinal variable on the extent of frontline participation within the campaign (78 percent), whether the campaign featured a gender-inclusive ideology (84 percent), and the extent of women in leadership roles (87 percent). However, all told, these are impressively high levels of inter-coder reliability, and all disagreements were remedied through additional research.

Once the data were finalized, as a further check on data reliability and content validity, I randomly selected several cases and conducted research from source materials published after the data collection had been completed (e.g., Darden, Henshaw, and Szekely 2019; Webster, Chen, and Beardsley 2019). Using those qualitative and quantitative data sources, I found 100 percent agreement between my independent coding decisions and the coding in the final data set.

This high level of inter-coder reliability speaks to both a strength and a weakness of the data. The strength is that they are highly reliable and accurate. The weakness is that much of this reliability and accuracy inheres from the over-aggregated nature of the data set. For instance, the fact that frontline participation is coded as present or absent over the entire campaign means that the data are not very informative. This is why the variable that codes the extent of frontline participation may be more informative—it allows for a range of responses rather than a dichotomous one. Unsurprisingly, the inter-coder reliability on this variable was, therefore, somewhat lower, although not devastatingly so.

The NAVCO 1.2 Data Set

The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data set (version 1.2) provides cross-sectional data on 338 maximalist campaigns from 1945 to 2014. The data identify cases where at least 1,000 were observed mobilizing to remove an incumbent national leader, secede, remove a foreign military occupation, or expel a colonial power. This current version expands upon the NAVCO 1.1 data set by extending coverage from 2006 to 2014 and adding numerous new gender-related variables. However, campaign-level variables—such as the primary method of resistance, peak participation, security forces' defections, regime violence, foreign state support to campaigns, support for or sanctions against the opponent government, and the outcomes of the campaigns—remain identical to the original coding rules. Please see navcodata.org for a more detailed description of variables, source materials, and coding rules in the NAVCO 1.1 data set.

Getting and Citing the WiRe Data

The data are permanently hosted on the Harvard Dataverse. Please cite these data accordingly, using the following citation:

Erica Chenoweth, 2019, "Women in Resistance Data Set," Harvard Dataverse, V1.

The Codebook

I designed the codebook and coding rules to mimic those of related studies that focus largely on armed groups. This is to ensure compatibility and comparison with existing studies (e.g., Asal et al. 2013; Thomas and Bond 2015; Henshaw 2016). See below.

Women in Resistance (WiRe) Data Set Codebook, V.1

Notes: This list of variables complements the NAVCO 1.2 data set. The unit of analysis is the campaign.

VARIABLE NAME	VARIABLE	DEFINITION	ADDITIONAL RULE(S)/ CLARIFICATION	EXAMPLE(S)
frontlineroles	Women in Frontline Roles (0=no; 1=yes)	Women reported/observed in combat roles or on front lines of peak demonstrations, protests, or nonviolent events (1) or not (0)	To qualify as a 1, must be reports of women actively involved in frontline confrontation against opponent personnel (either violently or nonviolently).	0=Taliban, an all-male group; 1=Khmer Rouge, which involved female cadres among combatants; Egyptian revolution, which involved women protesters on the front lines
extentfrontroles	Extent Women in Frontline Roles (0=none; 1=limited; 2=moderate; 3=extensive; -99 ambiguous/ unknown)	Extent of women's frontline participation. None (0) indicates no observed frontline role for women. Limited participation (1) indicates a handful of observed frontline women participants (i.e., women are less than 25% of frontline participants). Moderate participation (2) means that women are clearly and routinely involved in the front line of the campaign, and that the proportion of women campaigners is significant (between 25% and 50% of frontline participants). Extensive participation (3) means that women frontline campaigners comprised the majority (at least 50%) of observed participants. Ambiguous (-99) indicates that after extensive searching, the extent of frontline participation by women is ambiguous or difficult to nail down.	A code of 0 for this variable must match a code of 0 for the "Women in Frontline Roles" variable.	0=Taliban, an all-male group; 1=FLN, where women bombers received a lot of attention but were clearly a minority among the hundreds of thousands of male combatants; 2=the Cuban Revolution, where women constituted a named brigade and were claimed to have had significant numbers; 3=Bahrain, where women participants numbered about 50% of the total demonstrators
supportroles	Women in Support Roles (0=no; 1=yes)	Women reported/observed in support roles outside of the front lines (training for combatants/activists; hiding combatants/activists; slave labor; sexual slavery; gather, prepare, and cook food; porter; looting; mine sweepers; childcare and rearing; spies or informants; messengers; intelligence officers; communications) (1) or not (0)	A code of 0 means that extensive searching has turned up no explicit mention of women serving in a support capacity.	0=Afghan insurgency against Soviets, where women were not observed engaging in support roles; 1=FLN, where women provided extensive support outside of combat

symbolicrole	Women in Symbolic Support Roles (0=no; 1=yes)	Women reported/observed advocating for the campaign in the news or social media (1) or not (0)	A code of 0 means that extensive searching has turned up no explicit mention of women serving in a symbolic support capacity by advocating for the campaign in a public media or social media forum.	0=Lord's Resistance Army, where no women were observed supporting or advocating for the campaign in news or social media; 1=Egyptian revolution, where women took to Twitter and Facebook to pledge their support for the campaign
leadership	Women Reported in Active Leadership (0=no; 1=yes)	Women reported/observed in movement leadership (1) or not (0)	To qualify as a 1, there must be explicit mention of women functioning as campaign leaders, either as a single leader or in the context of a primary leadership group. If there is a women's wing or some other formal organization that is excluded from the primary movement leadership, this is coded as 0.	0=FLN in Algeria, where photographs of the six primary leaders of the group display only men; 1=Khmer Rouge, which had two female leaders; People Power movement, which had a female figurehead in Corazon Aquino
figureheads	Woman Icons/Symbolic Figureheads (0=no; 1=yes)	Women reported/observed as movement icons or symbolic figureheads, martyrs, etc., invoked by movement participants	To qualify as a 1, there must be explicit mention of specific women functioning as martyrs, icons, or symbolic figureheads. The iconic women must be representatives of the community the campaign purports to represent; religious, spiritual, or mythical icons are not included here.	0=Lord's Resistance Army, where there are no reported female figureheads; 1=Green Movement, which martyred "Nada," a girl shot in the head by Iranian security forces
extentleadership	Extent of Women Reported in Leadership (0=none; 1=women among formal leadership; 2=women primary campaign leaders; -99=ambiguous/unknown)	Extent of women in campaign leadership. None (0) indicates no observed women in campaign's upper echelons. Women among formal leadership (1) indicates that one or more women are among the campaign's leaders, but not the primary leader or figurehead. Women primary campaign leaders (2) indicates that the primary campaign leader is one or more women. If this is ambiguous or unknown after extensive searching, code this variable as -99.	A code of 0 for this variable must match a code of 0 for the "Women Reported in Leadership" variable.	0=FLN in Algeria, where photographs of the six primary leaders of the group display only men; 1=Khmer Rouge (Cambodia); 2=People Power (Philippines)

Women in Resistance (WiRe) Data Set Codebook, V.1 (cont)

VARIABLE NAME	VARIABLE	DEFINITION	ADDITIONAL RULE(S)/ CLARIFICATION	EXAMPLE(S)
voluntary	Reported Voluntary Women's Participation (0=no; 1=yes)	Reported/observed women's participation that is voluntary (i.e., apparently self-initiated/consensual) (1) or not (0)	This is not mutually exclusive with coerced participation. Both coerced and voluntary participation can occur within the same campaign. Often coders are required to make inferences about whether participation was voluntary or not. We assume that women's participation was voluntary unless circumstances from the case suggest otherwise.	0=Boko Haram, where girls are reported to be exclusively abducted and forcibly recruited; 1=FLN, where women were reportedly volunteers
coerced	Reported Coerced Women's Participation (0=no; 1=yes)	Reported/observed women's participation that is coerced (i.e., via abductions; forced marriages; sex slavery; slave labor; forced extraction of taxes, food, shelter) (1) or not (0)	This is not mutually exclusive with voluntary participation. Both coerced and voluntary participation can occur within the same campaign.	0=Bulgaria, where reportedly all women participants joined voluntarily; 1=FLN, where forced marriages and forced extraction reportedly took place, especially in rural areas of FLN control
wmissues	Women's Issues Central to Campaign Demands (0=no; 1=yes)	Women's issues featured among the top 5 demands made by the movement/campaign (1) or not (0)	Code for the entire campaign, not just for women participants of the campaign.	0=FLN, where women's equity was ultimately championed, but not among the top demands of the FLN; 1=Bahrain, where inclusion of women as full citizens in political life was among the major demands of this pro-democracy movement

<p>gi_ideol</p>	<p>Gender-Inclusive Ideology (0=no; 1=yes; 2=contested)</p>	<p>Segments of movement/campaign explicitly advocate the inclusion of women in public life or not (based on MAROB) (1) or not (0). A code of (2) suggests that the campaign is actively debating its ideology regarding gender inclusion.</p>	<p>This defaults to 0 unless there are explicit mentions by movement participants that the ideology is gender inclusive, or there are movement documents indicating as much. Coders should choose the code that best represents the campaign at its end (i.e., if this was contested early in the campaign but resolved later, code this variable according to the way the movement resolved the gender-inclusivity question). Note that this variable is not mutually exclusive with gender-exclusive ideology; both gender-inclusive and gender-exclusive ideologies can exist within the same campaign.</p>	<p>0=ISIS, which proscribes women in public life; 1=Bahrain, where women were actively promoted in political life as part of pro-democracy movement; 2=Khmer Rouge, where presence of several female leaders coexisted with calls for women to perform traditional gender roles</p>
<p>ge_ideol</p>	<p>Gender-Exclusive Ideology (0=no; 1=yes; 2=contested)</p>	<p>Segments of movement/campaign reported to advocate for the exclusion of women in public life or not (based on MAROB) (1) or not (0). A code of (2) suggests that the campaign is actively debating its ideology regarding gender exclusion.</p>	<p>This defaults to 0 unless there are explicit mentions by movement participants that the ideology is gender exclusive, or there are movement documents indicating as much. Coders should choose the code that best represents the campaign at its end (i.e., if this was contested early in the campaign but resolved later, code this variable according to the way the movement resolved the gender-exclusivity question). Note that this variable is not mutually exclusive with gender-inclusive ideology; both gender-inclusive and gender-exclusive ideologies can exist within the same campaign.</p>	<p>0=Bahrain, where no movement activists reported to promote gender-exclusive ideology; 1=Egypt, where there were calls among conservative activists for women to assume traditional gender roles; 2=Khmer Rouge, where presence of several female leaders coexisted with calls for women to perform traditional gender roles</p>

Women in Resistance (WiRe) Data Set Codebook, V.1 (cont)

VARIABLE NAME	VARIABLE	DEFINITION	ADDITIONAL RULE(S)/ CLARIFICATION	EXAMPLE(S)
formalinvolve	Formal Women's Groups Involved in Campaign (0=no; 1=yes)	Formal women's groups/associations/movements are involved in the movement/campaign (1) or not (0)	"Formal women's groups" means women's organizations with formal titles.	0=Bulgarian "Dance with Me" movement, that had no reported formal women's associations involved; 1=Let's Save Togo movement, which had a "Women's Wing" formally developed
peace_calls	Women Participants Observed Calling for Peace/ Peaceful Mobilization (0=no; 1=yes)	Women participants (either formal or informal) are reported to explicitly call for peace and/or peaceful mobilization (1) or not (0)	Code as 1 if women participants or formal women's groups are explicitly calling for peaceful mobilization or peace. This includes, by inference, women calling for methods of peaceful protest (e.g., sex strikes, candlelight vigils, etc.). 0 if otherwise.	0=Khmer Rouge, where women involved in campaign did not call for peace but rather were participants in combat; 1=People Power movement in the Philippines, where nuns explicitly called for peaceful mobilization
gbvwithin	Gender-Based Violence Reported Within Campaign (0=no; 1=yes)	Whether women participants face violence from within the movement for defying gender roles (1) or not (0)	Code as 1 only if women are reportedly harmed through direct physical force by other campaign participants for defying/transgressing traditional gender roles.	0=Bulgarian "Dance with Me" campaign, where there were no reported violent incidents against women who participated in the campaign from within; 1=FLN in Algeria, wherein some women reportedly experienced violent sanctions from within the movement when they transgressed gender roles.

<p>gbvagainst</p>	<p>Gender-Based Violence Reported Against Campaign (0=no; 1=yes)</p>	<p>Whether women participants reportedly face violence from outside the movement for defying gender roles (1) or not (0)</p>	<p>Code as 1 only if women are reportedly harmed through direct physical force by non-movement participants (i.e., state, counter-movement, etc.) for defying/transgressing traditional gender roles.</p>	<p>0=Bulgarian “Dance with Me” campaign, where there were no reported violent incidents targeting women specifically due to their participation in the campaign from outside the campaign; 1=Egyptian revolution, wherein some women reportedly experienced gender-based violence by police or criminals, targeting them because of their transgression of traditional gender roles.</p>
<p>discrimination</p>	<p>Gender-Based Discrimination Reported Within Campaign (0=no; 1=yes)</p>	<p>Whether women participants face political, social, or economic discrimination from within the movement (1) or not (0)</p>	<p>Code as 1 only if women report discrimination by other campaign participants in ways short of violence (i.e., exclusion from leadership or decision-making, denial of services, reduced wages, fewer options regarding participation, etc.).</p>	<p>0=Bulgarian “Dance with Me” campaign, where there was no reported discrimination against women who participated in the campaign from within; 1=FLN in Algeria, wherein some women reportedly experienced social sanctions from within the movement when they transgressed gender roles.</p>

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